کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1160571 | 1490349 | 2011 | 5 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Pierre Duhem’s epistemic aims and the intellectual virtue of humility: a reply to Ivanova Pierre Duhem’s epistemic aims and the intellectual virtue of humility: a reply to Ivanova](/preview/png/1160571.png)
David Stump (2007) has recently argued that Pierre Duhem can be interpreted as a virtue epistemologist. Stump’s claims have been challenged by Milena Ivanova (2010) on the grounds that Duhem’s ‘epistemic aims’ are more modest than those of virtue epistemologists. I challenge Ivanova’s criticism of Stump by arguing that she not distinguish between ‘reliabilist’ and ‘responsibilist’ virtue epistemologies. Once this distinction is drawn, Duhem clearly emerges as a ‘virtue-responsibilist’ in a way that complements Ivanova’s positive proposal that Duhem’s ‘good sense’ reflects a conception of the ‘ideal scientist’. I support my proposal that Duhem is a ‘virtue-responsibilist’ by arguing that his rejection of the possibility of our producing a ‘perfect theory’ reflects the key responsibilist virtue of ‘intellectual humility’.
Journal: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A - Volume 42, Issue 1, March 2011, Pages 185–189