Styles for philosophers of science

In this paper I discuss the bearing of Hacking’s ideas about Scientific Styles on traditional debates in the philosophy of science concerning rationality and realism. I argue that a kind of deflationary position with regard to realism debates is a natural consequence of Hacking’s claim that styles are self-authenticating. I then go on to argue, using an example of van Fraassen’s, that Hacking should allow a methodological role for realism debates and hence they are not idle, as he has claimed, although their resolution may not be important.

► Explores the connection between the styles project and realism/anti-realism disputes.
► Self-authenticating nature of styles provides reasons to reject some realist arguments.
► Van Fraassen’s anti-realism is untouched by these arguments.
► Argues that realism debate is not idle but plays an important heuristic role in science.