کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
354548 | 1434831 | 2013 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

Curriculum tracking creates incentives in the years before its start, and we should therefore expect test scores to be higher during those years. I find robust evidence for incentive effects of tracking in the UK based on the UK comprehensive school reform. Results from the Swedish comprehensive school reform are inconclusive. Internationally, I find a large and widening test score gap between early and late tracking countries. Incentive effects of tracking show how early age scores can be endogenous with respect to later-age policies, and add to a growing literature on incentives in education.
► Curriculum tracking should create incentives before its start.
► I find evidence for this using three different data sets.
► Educational test scores can be endogenous with respect to later age policies.
► Institutional incentives matter at young ages as well.
Journal: Economics of Education Review - Volume 32, February 2013, Pages 140–150