Nash Equilibrium in a two-settlement electricity market using competitive coevolutionary algorithms

• We are concerned by the analysis of two-settlement electricity market.
• We use a competitive coevolutionary algorithm to find Nash Equilibrium strategies.
• We simulate multiple market scenarios including generation limit and uncertainties.
• Coevolutionary algorithms are suitable for the analysis of electricity market.

This paper investigates the use of competitive coevolutionary algorithms to calculate suppliers’ optimal strategies in a deregulated electricity market. The two settlement model is used, consisting of a spot and a forward market. Agents can take part in both spot and forward transactions, and act strategically to maximise their profit from both markets. The strategic interactions of market agents are modelled as a non cooperative game. The competitive coevolutionary Algorithm is used to calculate the Nash Equilibrium strategies ensuring the best outcome for each agent. Results demonstrates the effectiveness of the coevolutionary approach to find the optimal strategies in different market situations.