کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
439306 | 690505 | 2007 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

This paper considers the many-to-many version of the stable marriage problem where each man and woman has a strict preference ordering on the members of the opposite sex that he or she considers acceptable. Further, each man and woman wishes to be matched to as many acceptable partners as possible, up to his or her specified quota. In this setup, a polynomial time algorithm for finding a stable matching that minimizes the sum of partner ranks across all men and women is provided. It is argued that this sum can be used as an optimality criterion for minimizing total dissatisfaction if the preferences over partner-combinations satisfy a no-complementarities condition. The results in this paper extend those already known for the one-to-one version of the problem.
Journal: Theoretical Computer Science - Volume 379, Issue 3, 15 June 2007, Pages 317-328