کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
4498044 | 1318962 | 2009 | 7 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Stochastic sampling of interaction partners versus deterministic payoff assignment
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم زیستی و بیوفناوری
علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک
علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک (عمومی)
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چکیده انگلیسی
Evolutionary game dynamics describes how successful strategies spread in a population. In well-mixed populations, the usual assumption, e.g. underlying the replicator dynamics, is that individuals obtain a payoff from interactions with a representative sample of the population. This determines their fitness. Here, we analyze a situation in which payoffs are obtained through a single interaction, so that individuals of the same type can have different payoffs. We show analytically that for weak selection, this scenario is identical to the usual approach in which an individual interacts with the whole population. For strong selection, however, differences arise that are reflected in the fixation probabilities and lead to deviating evolutionary dynamics.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology - Volume 257, Issue 4, 21 April 2009, Pages 689-695
Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology - Volume 257, Issue 4, 21 April 2009, Pages 689-695
نویسندگان
Benno Woelfing, Arne Traulsen,