کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
4498503 | 1318985 | 2009 | 6 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Evolutionary matrix games and optimization theory
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم زیستی و بیوفناوری
علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک
علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is only required to be capable of resisting invasion by rare mutant strategies. In contrast, an absolute invader strategy (AIS) is a rare mutant strategy that can invade any established strategy. We show that the predictions of the outcome of evolution made by optimization models are compatible with those made by the classical expected payoff comparisons in matrix games. We also show that if a matrix game has an AIS that AIS is unique and is also an ESS. But an ESS need not be an AIS. In pure-strategy submodels, an AIS need not be unique. An AIS of a matrix game has global asymptotic stability property in the game dynamics which involve only pure strategies including the AIS.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology - Volume 257, Issue 1, 7 March 2009, Pages 84–89
Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology - Volume 257, Issue 1, 7 March 2009, Pages 84–89
نویسندگان
J. Apaloo,