Application of game theory to fisheries over three decades

Thirty years have passed since Munro published his 1979 work on the potential applications of game theory to fisheries. It is pertinent to ask now: has this potential been realized, and in what forms? This paper highlights progress in the field over the past three decades. We begin our review with the early two-player dynamic game-theoretic analyses. Next, we illustrate how coalition theory has been brought in over the past decade to allow the modeling of games with greater than two players, and how coalitional externalities, a major issue in international and shared fish stocks management, have been incorporated recently. Finally, we highlight new areas for game theory to come into its own in fisheries, which will most definitely include the potential for catch rights in international shared-stock fisheries, as well as ecosystem dynamics to be modeled in a game-theoretic context. As game theory can offer insights into the challenges of achieving cooperative fisheries management, we hope the next decade of fisheries economics research will include a bigger leap from academic game theory exercises to impacting policy decisions.