کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
471056 | 698587 | 2012 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
مهندسی کامپیوتر
علوم کامپیوتر (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
Voting theory has become increasingly integrated with computational social choice and multiagent systems. Computational complexity has been extensively used as a shield against manipulation of voting systems, however for several voting schemes this complexity may cause calculating the winner to be computationally difficult. Of the many voting systems that have been studied with regard to election manipulation, a few have been found to have an unweighted coalitional manipulation problem that is NP-hard for a constant number of manipulators despite having a winner problem that is in P. We survey this interesting class of voting systems and the work that has analyzed their complexity.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Computer Science Review - Volume 6, Issues 2–3, May 2012, Pages 71–87
Journal: Computer Science Review - Volume 6, Issues 2–3, May 2012, Pages 71–87
نویسندگان
Curtis Menton, Preetjot Singh,