کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
477797 | 1446197 | 2007 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Pricing policies under direct vs. indirect channel competition and national vs. store brand competition Pricing policies under direct vs. indirect channel competition and national vs. store brand competition](/preview/png/477797.png)
This paper analyzes channel pricing in multiple distribution channels under competition between a national brand (NB) and a store brand (SB), where an NB can be distributed both through a direct channel (e-channel) and an indirect channel (local stores) but an SB can be distributed only through an indirect channel. We first explore cross-brand and cross-channel pricing policies. Formulating the problem as a Nash pricing game, we reach two findings: (1) brand loyalty building is profitable for both an NB and an SB; and (2) marketing decisions are more restrictive for an NB channel than they are for the SB channel. We next assess supply chain coordination and reach two findings: (1) wholesale price change does not coordinate the supply chain and (2) an appropriate combination of markup and markdown prices can achieve both supply chain coordination and a win–win outcome for each channel.
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research - Volume 180, Issue 1, 1 July 2007, Pages 262–281