Revisiting a game theoretic framework for the robust railway network design against intentional attacks

This paper discusses and extends some competitive aspects of the games proposed in an earlier work, where a robust railway network design problem was proposed as a non-cooperative zero-sum game in normal form between a designer/operator and an attacker. Due to the importance of the order of play and the information available to the players at the moment of their decisions, we here extend those previous models by proposing a formulation of this situation as a dynamic game. Besides, we propose a new mathematical programming model that optimizes both the network design and the allocation of security resources over the network. The paper also proposes a model to distribute security resources over an already existing railway network in order to minimize the negative effects of an intentional attack. For the sake of readability, all concepts are introduced with the help of an illustrative example.

► We analyze a railway network design problem.
► We propose a security resource allocation.
► The main objective is to minimize the effect of terrorist attacks.
► Spreading security resources so that expected effects are constant is optimal.