کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
480609 1446087 2012 11 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A collaborative decentralized distribution system with demand forecast updates
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه مهندسی کامپیوتر علوم کامپیوتر (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
A collaborative decentralized distribution system with demand forecast updates
چکیده انگلیسی

In this paper, we study inventory pooling coalitions within a decentralized distribution system consisting of a manufacturer, a warehouse (or an integration center), and n retailers. At the time their orders are placed, the retailers know their demand distribution but do not know the exact value of the demand. After certain production and transportation lead time elapses, the orders arrive at the warehouse. During this time, the retailers can update their demand forecasts.We first focus on cooperation among the retailers – the retailers coordinate their initial orders and can reallocate their orders in the warehouse after they receive more information about their demand and update their demand forecasts. We study two types of cooperation: forecast sharing and joint forecasting. By using an example, we illustrate how forecast sharing collaboration might worsen performance, and asymmetric forecasting capabilities of the retailers might harm the cooperation. However, this does not happen if the retailers possess symmetric forecasting capabilities or they cooperate by joint forecasting, and the associated cooperative games have non-empty cores.Finally, we analyze the impact that cooperation and non-cooperation of the retailers has on the manufacturer’s profit. We focus on coordination of the entire supply chain through a three-parameter buyback contract. We show that our three-parameter contract can coordinate the system if the retailers have symmetric margins. Moreover, under such a contract the manufacturer benefits from retailers’ cooperation since he can get a share of improved performance.


► We study two types of cooperation: forecast sharing and joint forecasting.
► The cooperative games associated with both situations have non-empty cores.
► Cooperation might worsen performance under asymmetric forecasting capabilities.
► A coordinating contract exists if the retailers have symmetric margins.
► The manufacturer benefits from retailers’ cooperation under a coordinating contract.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research - Volume 216, Issue 3, 1 February 2012, Pages 573–583
نویسندگان
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