Partnership formation based on multiple traits

A model of partnership formation based on two traits, called beauty and character, is presented. There are two classes of individual and partners must be of different classes. Individuals prefer prospective partners with a high beauty measure and of a similar character. This problem may be interpreted as e.g. a job search problem in which the classes are employer and employee, or a mate choice problem in which the classes are male and female. Beauty can be observed instantly. However, a costly date (or interview) is required to observe the character of a prospective partner. On observing the beauty of a prospective partner, an individual decides whether he/she wishes to date. During a date, the participants observe each other’s character and then decide whether to form a pair. Mutual acceptance is required both for a date to occur and pair formation. On finding a partner, an individual stops searching. Beauty has a continuous distribution on a finite interval, while character ‘forms a circle’ and has a uniform distribution. Criteria based on the concept of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium are used to define a symmetric equilibrium of this game. It is argued that this equilibrium is unique. When dating costs are high, this equilibrium is a block separating equilibrium as in more classical formulations of two-sided job search problems. However, for sufficiently small dating costs the form of this equilibrium is essentially different.

► This article presents a model of partnership based on two traits: beauty and character.
► Beauty can be observed quickly, but costly dating is required to observe character.
► The form of the equilibrium is derived.
► For high dating costs there is a block segregating equilibrium based on beauty.
► For low dating costs the form equilibrium is essentially different.