کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
480616 1446087 2012 11 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه مهندسی کامپیوتر علوم کامپیوتر (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects
چکیده انگلیسی

This paper analyzes situations in which a project consisting of several activities is not realized according to plan. If the project is expedited, a reward arises. Analogously, a penalty arises if the project is delayed. This paper considers the case of arbitrary nondecreasing reward and penalty functions on the total expedition and delay, respectively. Attention is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a corresponding cooperative project game determines a set of stable allocations of the total reward (penalty). In the definition of project games, surplus (cost) sharing mechanisms are used to take into account the specific characteristics of the reward (penalty) function at hand. It turns out that project games are related to bankruptcy and taxation games. This relation allows us to establish nonemptiness of the core of project games.


► Reward allocation of expedited projects.
► Cost allocation of delayed projects.
► Definition of a cooperative game to analyze these two allocation problems.
► Study of the core of the cooperative game as solution to the allocation problem.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research - Volume 216, Issue 3, 1 February 2012, Pages 647–657
نویسندگان
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