کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
481917 | 1446192 | 2007 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Two-settlement electricity markets with price caps and Cournot generation firms Two-settlement electricity markets with price caps and Cournot generation firms](/preview/png/481917.png)
We compare two alternative mechanisms for capping prices in two-settlement electricity markets. With sufficient lead time, forward market prices are implicitly capped by competitive pressure of potential entry that will occur when forward prices rise above some backstop price. Another more direct approach is to cap spot prices through a regulatory intervention. In this paper we explore the implications of these two alternative mechanisms in a two-settlement Cournot equilibrium framework. We formulate the market equilibrium as a stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) capturing congestion effects, probabilistic contingencies and horizontal market power. As an illustrative test case, we use the 53-bus Belgian electricity network with representative generator costs but hypothetical demand and ownership structure. Compared to a price-uncapped two-settlement system, a forward cap increases firms’ incentives for forward contracting, whereas a spot cap reduces such incentives. Moreover, in both cases, more forward contracts are committed as the generation resource ownership structure becomes more diversified.
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research - Volume 181, Issue 3, 16 September 2007, Pages 1279–1296