کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5034551 | 1471630 | 2017 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A theory of outsourced fundraising: Why dollars turn into “Pennies for Charity”
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Charities frequently rely on professional solicitors whose commissions exceed half of the solicited donations. To understand this practice, we propose a principal-agent model in which the charity optimally offers a higher commission to a more efficient solicitor, raising the price of giving significantly. Outsourcing is, therefore, profitable for the charity only if giving is very price-inelastic, which is not supported by empirical evidence. We show that outsourced fundraising can be optimal if: donors are unaware of this practice; the professional solicitor better activates donors' warm-glow feelings toward the cause; or there is a significant fixed cost of fundraising. We argue that informing the public of the mere existence of paid solicitations may be the most effective policy available.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 137, May 2017, Pages 1-18
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 137, May 2017, Pages 1-18
نویسندگان
Zdravko Paskalev, Huseyin Yildirim,