Inferential and referential lexical semantic competence: A critical review of the supporting evidence

- In philosophical semantics, a distinction has been proposed between inferential and referential lexical semantic competence.
- Recent neuroscience research suggests that this distinction can be neurally implemented.
- A critical review of the neuropsychological and neuroanatomical data supporting the inf/ref hypothesis is provided.

In philosophical semantics, a distinction has been proposed between inferential and referential lexical semantic competence. The former accounts for the relationship of words to the world, the latter for the relationship of words among themselves. Recent neuroscience research suggests that the distinction might be actually neurally implemented. That is, that inferential and referential abilities might be underpinned by two functionally independent cognitive architectures, with partly different neural realizations. This hypothesis is consistent with brain patient data, supporting the notion of a functional double dissociation between inferential and referential abilities, and with neuroscience data, suggesting that inferential and referential abilities are underpinned by at least partly different regions of the human brain. The principal aim of this article is to provide the first comprehensive and critical review of the empirical evidence in favour of such hypothesis.