کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5047391 1476271 2014 14 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
College admissions in China: A mechanism design perspective
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
پذیرش کالج در چین: چشم انداز طراحی سازوکار
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی

This paper justifies the evolution of the college admissions system in China from a mechanism design perspective. The sequential choice algorithm and the parallel choice algorithm used in the context of China's college admissions system are formulated as the well-studied Boston mechanism and the Simple Serial Dictatorship mechanism. We review both theoretical and experimental mechanism design literature in similar assignment problems. Studies show that the Boston mechanism does not eliminate justified envy, is not strategy-proof and is not Pareto-efficient. The Simple Serial Dictatorship mechanism eliminates justified envy, is strategy-proof and is Pareto-efficient, thus outperforming the Boston mechanism in all three criteria. This result provides justification for the transition in recent years from the sequential choice algorithm to the parallel choice algorithm in China's college admissions practices.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: China Economic Review - Volume 30, September 2014, Pages 618-631
نویسندگان
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