کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5047936 | 1370926 | 2010 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The pervasiveness and severity of tunneling by controlling shareholders in China
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This article investigates tunneling by controlling shareholders in China's public companies, and finds that, first, tunneling is pervasive and severe; and, second, private controlling ownership significantly increases the severity of tunneling. This article argues that in China, where there is not sufficient and effective legal protection for investors, controlling shareholders, especially shareholders of privately controlled public companies, are able to conduct tunneling at minimal costs. Further, corporate governance mechanisms alone are not sufficient to protect minority shareholders.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: China Economic Review - Volume 21, Issue 2, June 2010, Pages 310-323
Journal: China Economic Review - Volume 21, Issue 2, June 2010, Pages 310-323
نویسندگان
Guoping Li,