Justifying precautionary policies: Incommensurability and uncertainty

- The Precautionary Principle is justified for decisions involving uncertainty and incommensurability.
- The normative argument appeals to formal decision theory and Rawlsian political philosophy.
- The 'greater' the uncertainty, the 'less' incommensurability is required to justify precautionary action, and vice versa.

When decisions are taken in conditions of Keynesian or Knightian uncertainty, and when there is a threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage, the Precautionary Principle is often recommended to guide decision-making. However, the Precautionary Principle has been widely criticised. In response to these criticisms, a qualitative version of the Precautionary Principle is developed which draws its normative content from a blend of formal decision theory and political philosophy. It is argued that precautionary action can be justified by some flexible combination of uncertainty and incommensurability. The 'greater' the uncertainty, the 'less' incommensurability is required to justify precautionary action, and vice versa. Throughout the paper, the arguments are explored using the example of climate change decision problems.