کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5065134 | 1476727 | 2013 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
We analyse optimal environmental policies in a market that is vertically differentiated in terms of the energy efficiency of products. Considering energy taxes, subsidies to firms for investment in more eco-friendly products, and product standards, we are particularly interested in how distributional goals in addition to environmental goals shape the choice of policy instruments. We find that an industry-friendly government levies an energy tax to supplement a lax product standard, but shies away from subsidies to firms. By contrast, a consumer-friendly government relies heavily on a strict product standard and additionally implements a moderate subsidy to firms, but avoids energy taxes.
⺠We analyse how distributional goals shape environmental policy. ⺠Firms invest in the energy efficiency of their products and compete in prices. ⺠An industry-friendly government implements an energy tax and a lax product standard. ⺠A consumer-friendly government chooses a subsidy to firms instead of an energy tax. ⺠A consumer-friendly government implements a strict energy efficiency standard.
Journal: Energy Economics - Volume 36, March 2013, Pages 444-453