Environmental policy and the energy efficiency of vertically differentiated consumer products

We analyse optimal environmental policies in a market that is vertically differentiated in terms of the energy efficiency of products. Considering energy taxes, subsidies to firms for investment in more eco-friendly products, and product standards, we are particularly interested in how distributional goals in addition to environmental goals shape the choice of policy instruments. We find that an industry-friendly government levies an energy tax to supplement a lax product standard, but shies away from subsidies to firms. By contrast, a consumer-friendly government relies heavily on a strict product standard and additionally implements a moderate subsidy to firms, but avoids energy taxes.

► We analyse how distributional goals shape environmental policy. ► Firms invest in the energy efficiency of their products and compete in prices. ► An industry-friendly government implements an energy tax and a lax product standard. ► A consumer-friendly government chooses a subsidy to firms instead of an energy tax. ► A consumer-friendly government implements a strict energy efficiency standard.