کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5066902 | 1476808 | 2013 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
We study a fundamental conflict in economic decision-making, the trade-off between equality, equity and incentives, in a new experimental game that nests a voluntary contributions mechanism in a broader spectrum of incentive schemes. In a 2Ã2 design, we let subjects either vote on or exogenously encounter incentive settings while assigned unequal endowments are either task-determined or random. We find that earned endowments lead to less support for redistribution and less cooperation. Subjects' voting is influenced by egalitarian and equity concerns, in addition to self-interest. Cooperation rates respond rather continuously to incentives.
⺠We study the trade-off between equality, equity and incentives. ⺠We develop a new experimental framework nesting a voluntary contribution mechanism. ⺠Subjects differ in endowments and can vote on redistribution. ⺠We find subjects' voting to be influenced by egalitarian and equity concerns. ⺠Cooperation rates respond rather continuously to incentives.
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 60, May 2013, Pages 32-51