کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5067034 | 1476811 | 2013 | 24 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
A seller decides whether to allocate an item among two potential buyers. The seller and buyer 1 interact ex post in such a way that each of them suffers a negative externality if the other possesses the item. We show that the optimal allocation rule favors buyer 2, who does not interact ex post with the seller, and in particular bidder 1 may not obtain the good even if his valuation is highest. The auction is therefore subject to resale. When resale is possible, the seller must distort the original auction. We show that the mechanism depends crucially on the way resale is organized ex post. The seller may decide to always allocate the good to the agent with the highest valuation when rents are fully extracted by an intermediary on the resale market. However, she may resort to a stochastic mechanism when the winner of the primary auction has full bargaining power in the resale stage.
⸠I model an auction with ex post asymmetric interactions between players. ⸠The optimal auction favors the buyers who do not interact with the seller. ⸠I study the effect of resale on this mechanism. ⸠The allocation under resale depends on the way resale is organized.
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 57, January 2013, Pages 39-62