کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5067289 | 1372583 | 2009 | 16 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
We investigate whether temporary members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) using panel data for 197 countries over the period from 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic, political, and country-specific factors. There is also evidence that Security Council membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. IMF loans seem to be a mechanism by which the major shareholders of the Fund can win favor with voting members of the Security Council.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 53, Issue 7, October 2009, Pages 742-757
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 53, Issue 7, October 2009, Pages 742-757
نویسندگان
Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, James Raymond Vreeland,