کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5067569 | 1372605 | 2009 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Not just babble: Opening the black box of communication in a voluntary contribution experiment
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Not just babble: Opening the black box of communication in a voluntary contribution experiment Not just babble: Opening the black box of communication in a voluntary contribution experiment](/preview/png/5067569.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We let subjects in a voluntary contribution experiment make non-binding numerical announcements about their “possible” contributions and, in some treatments, send written promises to contribute specific amounts. We find that announcements were responded to both by others' announcements and by real play, for example announcements led to costly punishment when found to be misleading. We also find that adding pre-play announcements to treatments with punishment can increase efficiency by letting cost-free warnings substitute for costly punishment. The threat of punishing false announcements and promises helps reduce false signals, but only when promise statements can be sent is the effect sufficient for achieving greater efficiency.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 53, Issue 3, April 2009, Pages 309-326
Journal: European Economic Review - Volume 53, Issue 3, April 2009, Pages 309-326
نویسندگان
Olivier Bochet, Louis Putterman,