کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5069581 | 1476991 | 2015 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Strategic coordination in forecasting - An experimental study
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
While reputational herding has been shown to contribute to poor economic forecasting, the underlying behavioral mechanisms have not yet been empirically investigated. We run a forecasting experiment with contradictory incentives for accuracy and coordination, finding subjects' forecasts to be inaccurate and driven by the coordination motive. Coordination is achieved through the salient, risk-dominant equilibrium, i.e. merely forecasting the current values. Subjects succeeding in coordinating earn significantly more than those striving for accuracy. Our results emphasize that reputational herding should be considered as a driving force for persistently poor prediction accuracy and systematically biased forecasts towards consensus values.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Finance Research Letters - Volume 13, May 2015, Pages 155-162
Journal: Finance Research Letters - Volume 13, May 2015, Pages 155-162
نویسندگان
Lukas Meub, Till Proeger, Kilian Bizer, Markus Spiwoks,