کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071355 | 1477055 | 2017 | 47 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
انتظارات از دست رفته و تعامل استراتژیک
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
By extending the equilibrium concepts of KÅszegi and Rabin, 2006, KÅszegi and Rabin, 2007, this paper analyzes the strategic interaction of expectation-based loss-averse players. For loss-averse players with choice-acclimating expectations, the utility from playing a mixed strategy is not linear but convex in the probabilities they assign to their pure strategies. As a consequence, they are generally unwilling to randomize and an equilibrium may fail to exist. For players with choice-unacclimating expectations, by contrast, randomizing over their pure strategies may indeed constitute a credible best response and an equilibrium always exists. Building upon these insights, we delineate how expectation-based loss-averse players differ in their strategic behavior from their counterparts with standard expected-utility preferences, derive novel strategic effects, discuss equilibrium selection, and derive equilibrium play for some simple games.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 104, July 2017, Pages 681-705
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 104, July 2017, Pages 681-705
نویسندگان
Simon Dato, Andreas Grunewald, Daniel Müller, Philipp Strack,