کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071404 | 1477054 | 2017 | 38 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Sequential commitment games
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
بازی های تعهدی سریال
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider an extensive-form game in which players have the option to commit to actions before the game is played. We focus on commitment procedures where players make voluntary irreversible commitments in a prescribed order over the decision nodes. We study whether such commitment procedures may lead to Pareto-efficient outcomes. Our main result is surprisingly positive: for two-player games, we introduce an order over the decision nodes for which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is Pareto-efficient for every strict preference of the players over the outcomes. We show that the above result does not hold for games with four players.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 105, September 2017, Pages 297-315
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 105, September 2017, Pages 297-315
نویسندگان
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Moshe Tennenholtz,