کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5071451 1477059 2016 30 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
یک بررسی تجربی از دینامیک تنظیم تصادفی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper describes an experiment designed to test which, if any, stochastic adjustment dynamic most accurately captures the behaviour of a large population. The setting is a large population coordination game, the Language Game of Neary (2012), in which actions are strategic complements and two homogeneous groups have differing preferences over equilibria. We find that subject behaviour is highly consistent with the myopic best-response learning rule with deviations from this rule that are (i) dependent on the myopic best-response payoff but not on the deviation payoff, and (ii) directed in the sense of being group-dependent. We also find a time trend to deviations, with the magnitude tapering off as time progresses. This is in contrast to much of the theoretical literature that supposes a variety of other specifications of learning rules and both time-independent and payoff-dependent explanations for deviations.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 100, November 2016, Pages 208-219
نویسندگان
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