کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5071612 1477062 2016 18 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
جمع آوری اطلاعات ناقص قبل از امضای یک قرارداد
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
I study information gathering for rent-seeking purposes in contracting. In my model, an agent learns his payoff type only after accepting a contract, but can at costs acquire imperfect information while deliberating whether to accept. I show that the principal deters the acquisition if and only if the costs are high. The result stands in contrast to a finding by Crémer and Khalil (1992), who demonstrate that the acquisition of perfect information will always be deterred. A key insight is that the case of imperfect information is an instance of a sequential-screening problem.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 97, May 2016, Pages 70-87
نویسندگان
,