کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071703 | 1477073 | 2014 | 16 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
بهینه و کارایی در طراحی بازار: مقایسه دو مزایده دوگانه
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers and m sellers. Traders privately know their values/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms are considered. The buyer's bid double auction collects bids and asks from traders and determines the allocation by selecting a market-clearing price. It fails to achieve all possible gains from trade because of strategic bidding. The designed mechanism is a revelation mechanism in which honest reporting of values/costs is incentive compatible and all gains from trade are achieved. This optimality, however, comes at the expense of plausibility: (i) the monetary transfers among the traders are defined in terms of the traders' beliefs about each other's value/cost; (ii) a trader may suffer a loss ex post; (iii) the mechanism may run a surplus/deficit ex post. We compare the virtues of the simple yet mildly inefficient buyer's bid double auction to the flawed yet perfectly efficient designed mechanism.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 86, July 2014, Pages 248-263
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 86, July 2014, Pages 248-263
نویسندگان
Mark A. Satterthwaite, Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis,