کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071715 | 1477073 | 2014 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Destroy to save
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
نجات برای نجات
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
Recent work modified the classic VCG mechanism by redistributing as much of the payments as possible back to the agents while still satisfying incentive constraints. This approach guarantees allocative efficiency, but in some cases a large percentage of social welfare is lost. In this paper, we provide a mechanism that is not allocatively efficient but is instead guaranteed to achieve at least 80% of the social welfare as nââ. Moreover, in the extreme case of m=nâ1 where VCG-based mechanisms provide zero welfare, the percentage of social welfare maintained by our mechanism asymptotically approaches 100%.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 86, July 2014, Pages 392-404
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 86, July 2014, Pages 392-404
نویسندگان
Geoffroy de Clippel, Victor Naroditskiy, Maria Polukarov, Amy Greenwald, Nicholas R. Jennings,