کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071784 | 1477077 | 2013 | 22 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
- This paper explains the seller optimality of partial disclosure in a single-item private-value auction with two bidders.
- The identified optimal mechanism is a sequential second-price auction with a reserve price and a buy-now price.
- The seller optimally keeps the bids confidential and, sometimes, hides the order in which he approaches the bidders.
Negotiations about a merger or acquisition are often sequential and only partially disclose to bidders information about each otherʼs bids. This paper explains the seller optimality of partial disclosure in a single-item private-value auction with two bidders. Each bidder can inspect the item at a nonprohibitive cost. If a revenue-maximizing seller cannot charge bidders for the information about the otherʼs bid, then the seller optimally runs a sequential second-price auction with a reserve price and a buy-now price. The seller prefers to keep the bids confidential and, sometimes, to hide the order in which he approaches the bidders.
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 82, November 2013, Pages 522-543