کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5071847 1477072 2014 21 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Variable temptations and black mark reputations
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
وسوسه های متغیر و اعتبارات علامت سیاه
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی


- We study situations, where the temptation to betray varies across encounters.
- Past influences current play only through its effect on certain summary statistics.
- Study equilibria when players condition only on number of betrayals (black marks).
- Conditioning also on the number of interactions does not prolong trust.
- Stochastic variations where black marks may be forgotten do not improve outcomes.

Reputations often guide sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider situations where each player is randomly matched with a partner in every period. One player - the truster - decides whether to trust. If trusted, the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to betray. The strength of temptation, private information to the temptee, varies across encounters. Betrayals are recorded as publicly known black marks. First, we identify equilibria when players only condition on the number of a temptee's black marks. Second, we show that conditioning on the number of interactions as well as on the number of black marks does not prolong trust. Third, we examine stochastic variations where black marks may be forgotten. Perhaps surprisingly, such variations do not improve outcomes. Fourth, when players condition on more general summary statistics of a temptee's past, we study equilibria where trust is suspended temporarily.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 87, September 2014, Pages 70-90
نویسندگان
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