کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5071855 1477072 2014 15 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
بیش از حد و گسترش در آزمایش های جستجوی اجاره: ساختار هزینه و قوانین تخصیص جایزه
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of efforts, which we term 'overspreading.' We investigate the effects of allocating the prize by a lottery versus sharing it proportionally, and of convex versus linear costs of effort, while holding fixed the Nash equilibrium prediction for effort. We find the share rule results in average effort closer to the Nash prediction, and lower variation of effort. Combining the share rule with a convex cost function further enhances these results. We can explain a significant amount of non-equilibrium behavior by features of the experimental design. These results contribute towards design guidelines for contests based on behavioral principles that take into account implementation features of a contest.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 87, September 2014, Pages 224-238
نویسندگان
, , ,