کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072000 | 1373488 | 2012 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with Logit Dynamics
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with Logit Dynamics Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with Logit Dynamics](/preview/png/5072000.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
This note shows, by means of two simple, three-strategy games, the existence of stable periodic orbits and of multiple, interior steady states in a smooth version of the Best-Response Dynamics, the Logit Dynamics. The main finding is that, unlike Replicator Dynamics, generic Hopf bifurcation and thus, stable limit cycles, occur under the Logit Dynamics, even for three-strategy games. We also show that the Logit Dynamics displays another bifurcation which cannot occur under the Replicator Dynamics: the fold bifurcation, with non-monotonic creation and disappearance of steady states.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 74, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 434-441
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 74, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 434-441
نویسندگان
Cars H. Hommes, Marius I. Ochea,