کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072029 1373489 2012 5 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter
چکیده انگلیسی
We generalize the dynamic bargaining game of Diermeier and Fong (2011) to arbitrary quota rules to provide a non-cooperative characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. Assuming that players are sufficiently patient and have strict preferences, a pure-strategy stationary equilibrium exists and in any such equilibrium, a policy is a steady state if and only if it is in the stable set. The result provides a non-cooperative foundation of stable sets in settings with dynamic policy-making and a persistent agenda setter.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 76, Issue 1, September 2012, Pages 349-353
نویسندگان
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