کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072120 1373492 2012 10 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
چکیده انگلیسی
The literature on ascending combinatorial auctions yields conflicting insights regarding the possibility to implement the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. We introduce the class of minimal ascending auctions, a class which allows one to disconnect the final payments from the final bids but which prohibits the raising of the price vector of a provisionally winning bidder. We first establish the impossibility of implementing the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. Second, we propose a minimal ascending auction that yields a bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium thanks to payment discounts.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 75, Issue 2, July 2012, Pages 990-999
نویسندگان
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