کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072147 1373493 2011 7 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom
چکیده انگلیسی
We show that the Shapley-Shubik power index on the domain of simple (voting) games can be uniquely characterized without the efficiency axiom. In our axiomatization, the efficiency is replaced by the following weaker requirement that we term the gain-loss axiom: any gain in power by a player implies a loss for someone else (the axiom does not specify the extent of the loss). The rest of our axioms are standard: transfer (which is the version of additivity adapted for simple games), symmetry or equal treatment, and dummy.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 73, Issue 2, November 2011, Pages 615-621
نویسندگان
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