کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072170 | 1373494 | 2011 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Proving the folk theorem in a game with three or more players usually requires imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the stage-game payoffs. Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) assume full dimensionality of payoffs, while Abreu et al. (1994) assume the weaker NEU condition (“nonequivalent utilities”). In this note, we consider a class of n-player games where each player receives the same stage-game payoff, either zero or one. The stage-game payoffs therefore constitute a one-dimensional set, violating NEU. We show that if all players have different discount factors, then for discount factors sufficiently close to one, any strictly individually rational payoff profile can be obtained as the outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium with public correlation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 73, Issue 1, September 2011, Pages 287-295
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 73, Issue 1, September 2011, Pages 287-295
نویسندگان
Yves Guéron, Thibaut Lamadon, Caroline D. Thomas,