کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072233 1373497 2011 15 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Ambiguous act equilibria
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Ambiguous act equilibria
چکیده انگلیسی
A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies is used to study the effect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of “independent strategies” as well as of “common priors” are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack probabilistic sophistication. Within this framework the equilibrium predictions of two-player games with ambiguity-averse and with ambiguity-neutral players are observationally equivalent. This equivalence result does not extend to the case of games with more than two players. A translation of the concept of equilibrium in beliefs to the context of ambiguity aversion yields substantially different predictions - even for the case with just two players.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 71, Issue 2, March 2011, Pages 246-260
نویسندگان
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