کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072319 | 1477082 | 2010 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Does information transparency decrease coordination failure?
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We test the effect of information transparency on the probability of coordination failure in games with finite signals. Prior theory has shown that the effect of information transparency is ambiguous. Our study is based on two insights. Where signal space is finite, increased transparency usually destroys uniqueness of equilibria; and increasing transparency can reverse the risk-dominance ordering of equilibria. Our experiments show that increasing transparency improves coordination only when transparency makes the efficient equilibrium risk dominant. Coordination is degraded when increased transparency causes the secure equilibrium to be risk dominant. These results are consistent with subjects holding level-1 beliefs.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 70, Issue 2, November 2010, Pages 228-241
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 70, Issue 2, November 2010, Pages 228-241
نویسندگان
Regina M. Anctil, John Dickhaut, Cathleen Johnson, Chandra Kanodia,