کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072347 1373501 2011 9 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
چکیده انگلیسی
The other demand game allows for probabilistic continuation in cases of infeasible joint demands. Specifically, with probability (1−p) the game terminates and the players receive their disagreement payoffs; but with probability p the game continues to a second stage in which one of the two incompatible demands is randomly selected and implemented. Surprisingly, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is always the outcome of the most robust equilibrium of this game. Moreover, ranking other solution concepts is impossible.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 71, Issue 1, January 2011, Pages 14-22
نویسندگان
, ,