کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072356 | 1373501 | 2011 | 19 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Infection and immunization: A new class of evolutionary game dynamics
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Building upon a central paradigm of evolutionary game theory, namely the invasion barrier, we propose the new Infection and Immunization Dynamics (InfImmDyn), modelling a plausible adaptation process in a large population. For general games, this yields a novel refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept based on dynamical arguments, close in spirit to Nash's original “mass action” idea in his Ph.D. thesis. For partnership games, InfImmDyn exhibits a better asymptotic behavior compared to other popular procedures like Fictitious Play and Replicator Dynamics. We establish even support separation of InfImmDyn in finite time, which can never be achieved by any interior-point method like those mentioned above. In fact, this property has not yet been established for any other evolutionary game dynamics.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 71, Issue 1, January 2011, Pages 193-211
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 71, Issue 1, January 2011, Pages 193-211
نویسندگان
Samuel Rota Bulò, Immanuel M. Bomze,