کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072394 | 1373503 | 2010 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The myth of the Folk Theorem
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
The Folk Theorem for repeated games suggests that finding Nash equilibria in repeated games should be easier than in one-shot games. In contrast, we show that the problem of finding any Nash equilibrium for a three-player infinitely-repeated game is as hard as it is in two-player one-shot games. More specifically, for any two-player game, we give a simple construction of a three-player game whose Nash equilibria (even under repetition) correspond to those of the one-shot two-player game. Combined with recent computational hardness results for one-shot two-player normal-form games (Daskalakis et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2007), this gives our main result: the problem of finding an (epsilon) Nash equilibrium in a given nÃnÃn game (even when all payoffs are in {â1,0,1}) is PPAD-hard (under randomized reductions).
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 70, Issue 1, September 2010, Pages 34-43
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 70, Issue 1, September 2010, Pages 34-43
نویسندگان
Christian Borgs, Jennifer Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Adam Tauman Kalai, Vahab Mirrokni, Christos Papadimitriou,