کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072542 1373508 2010 8 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider a principal-agent model of adverse selection where, in order to trade with the principal, the agent must undertake a relationship-specific investment which affects his outside option to trade, i.e. the payoff that he can obtain by trading with an alternative principal. This creates a distinction between the agent's ex ante (before investment) and ex post (after investment) outside options to trade. We investigate the consequences of this distinction, and show that whenever an agent's ex ante and ex post outside options differ, this may equip the principal with an additional tool for screening among different agent types, by randomizing over the probability with which trade occurs once the agent has undertaken the investment. In turn, this may enhance the efficiency of the optimal second-best contract.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 68, Issue 2, March 2010, Pages 781-788
نویسندگان
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