کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072599 | 1373510 | 2008 | 21 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions](/preview/png/5072599.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider first-price and second-price auctions with asymmetric buyers, and examine whether pre-auction offers to a subset of buyers are profitable. A single offer is never profitable prior to a second-price auction, but may be profitable prior to a first-price auction. However, a sequence of offers is profitable in either type of auction. In our model, suitably chosen pre-auction offers work because they move the assignment when bidder valuations are “near the top” closer to the optimal, revenue-maximizing assignment.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 63, Issue 1, May 2008, Pages 145-165
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 63, Issue 1, May 2008, Pages 145-165
نویسندگان
René Kirkegaard, Per Baltzer Overgaard,