کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072606 1373510 2008 20 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Coordination cycles
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Coordination cycles
چکیده انگلیسی
Players repeatedly face a coordination problem in a dynamic global game. By choosing a risky action (invest) instead of waiting, players risk instantaneous losses as well as a loss of payoffs from future stages, in which they cannot participate if they go bankrupt. Thus, the total strategic risk associated with investment in a particular stage depends on the expected continuation payoff. High continuation payoff makes investment today more risky and therefore harder to coordinate on, which decreases today's payoff. Thus, expectation of successful coordination tomorrow undermines successful coordination today, which leads to fluctuations of equilibrium behavior even if the underlying economic fundamentals happen to be the same across the rounds. The dynamic game inherits the equilibrium uniqueness of the underlying static global game.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 63, Issue 1, May 2008, Pages 308-327
نویسندگان
,