کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072621 | 1373511 | 2009 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Mediators in position auctions
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
A mediator is a reliable entity which plays on behalf of the players who give her the right to play. The mediator acts in a pre-specified way based on messages received from the players. However, a mediator cannot enforce behavior; that is, players can play in the game directly without the mediator's help. A mediator generates a new game for the players, the mediated game. The outcome in the original game of an equilibrium in the mediated game is called a mediated equilibrium. Monderer and Tennenholtz introduced a theory of mediators for games with complete information. We extend the theory of mediators to games with incomplete information, and apply the new theory to position auctions, a central topic in electronic commerce. We provide a minimal set of conditions on position auctions, which is sufficient to guarantee that the VCG outcome function is a mediated equilibrium in these auctions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 67, Issue 1, September 2009, Pages 2-21
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 67, Issue 1, September 2009, Pages 2-21
نویسندگان
Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz,