کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072647 | 1373512 | 2007 | 27 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of finite horizon differential games
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of finite horizon differential games The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of finite horizon differential games](/preview/png/5072647.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
Envelope theorems are established for a ubiquitous class of finite horizon differential games. The theorems cover open-loop and feedback information patterns in which the corresponding Nash equilibria are locally differentiable with respect to the parameters of the game. Their relationship with extant envelope results is discussed and an application of them to a generalized capital accumulation game is provided. An important implication of the theorems is that, in general, the archetypal economic interpretation of the costate vector, namely, as the shadow value of the state vector along the Nash equilibrium, is valid for feedback Nash equilibria, but not for open-loop Nash equilibria.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 61, Issue 2, November 2007, Pages 198-224
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 61, Issue 2, November 2007, Pages 198-224
نویسندگان
Michael R. Caputo,